

# NOLAN AT BALAKLAVA: PART III \* : HUGH HENRY ROSE'S JOURNAL FOR 25 OCTOBER, 1854

by Dr Douglas J Austin      09      [ TWC 24(3) p20 2006 ]

**I dedicate this article to the memory of our good friend Brian Abbott.**

This is, I believe, the first extended transcription of an important high-level eye-witness record. Composed very shortly after the battle, it describes the moment when Captain Lewis Edward Nolan was handed the written 4th Order which sent the Light Brigade into the killing ground at Balaklava. For students of the battle, it includes much else of interest, which may lead to reinterpretations of known events (See <sup>35</sup>, below). A relevant extract from a letter by a Captain Edward Gage, a staff officer, is quoted with permission from the National Army Museum, Chelsea. I judge that this article establishes a background to Nolan's attempt to redirect the Light Brigade and provides corroborative evidence for it. In addition, it can be read to indicate that Airey (Raglan's Quarter-Master-General) bore a direct responsibility for the tactical implementation of Raglan's strategic wishes. This would place far more blame, for the ensuing heavy losses, on Airey than previously ascribed. Nolan's assignment as 'the culprit' emerged very rapidly after the event but on the day, Raglan first blamed Airey, then Cardigan and finally Lucan.

Colonel Hugh Henry Rose (1801-1885: K.C.B. 1855; Baron Strathnaim 1866; Field Marshal 1877) served in the British army with great distinction in Syria (1840-41) and as HM Consul-General in that country (1841- 1848). Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary, brought him into the regular diplomatic service, appointing him Secretary to the embassy at Constantinople in January 1851. The British Ambassador, Stratford Canning, returned to England on leave in June 1852 and Rose became Chargé d'Affaires. He was therefore obliged to manage the diplomatic crisis which preceded the outbreak of the Crimean war in March 1854, following which he was appointed as H.M. the Queen's Commissioner to the French headquarters in the Crimea. Rose acquitted himself splendidly in his highly responsible and delicate new position - on the battlefield as well as at the conference table (*see Oxford DNB*). Most accounts of the Crimean campaign record events only at the tactical level. In contrast, Rose was well placed to witness and record the interactions between the allied leaders at the highest levels of strategic and field command.

Rose's Journal of the Crimean War (British Library Add 42837 (314 ff) and Add 42838 (126 ff)) covers the period from 14 June 1854 to 5 June 1856, with gaps including 13 September to 16 October, 1854 - which thereby omits the Battle of the Alma. It is likely that he wrote up his notes at the end of each day and that his marginal headings were added later. It is an outstanding document, partly written in French, full of verbatim conversations and first-hand reports of important deliberations, decisions and events. It has, however, been largely neglected, with the notable exception of Alan Palmer, who quoted from the Balaklava entry on pp 124- 131 of '*The Banner of Battle*', Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1987. Trevor Royle mentioned it briefly on pp 273 and 276 of '*Crimea : The Great Crimean War 1854-1856*', Abacus, 1999. A primary reason for this neglect is that the journal (clearly better described as '*Notes for a Journal*') is written in a crabbed and extremely difficult hand on pages only some 16.5 cm high by 10 cm wide, often with 25 or more lines per page. Rose used many abbreviations (which I have expanded when possible) and sometimes omitted punctuation and capital letters, adding to the problems of decipherment. Even after close inspection of the original and with help from David Kelsey and Alan Palmer, this transcription remains incomplete. Below, I show Rose's text in bold, illegible words as '[?]' and my own interpolations in italics. My numbered end-notes, which give factual information as well as my interpretations, allow me to dispense with a more elaborate commentary. I thank Rod Robinson, Mike Hinton, Jerome Lantz and others for their valuable comments on the text. The fullest possible publication of this important journal is certain to be valuable to students



of the Crimean War - and will be a demanding and lengthy task. I now offer the most cordial invitation to others to join me in this work.

Please feel free to contact me at douglas.austin@zen.co.uk or by other means.

\* Parts I and II were published as '*Nolan did try to redirect the Light Brigade*' and '*Nolan at Balaklava: A Reply*' in '*The War Correspondent*' Vol 23 (4), 20-21, 2006 and Vol 24 (2), 7-8, 2006 respectively.

As background material, I note that William Howard Russell's description of the Battle of Balaklava was published in '*The Times*' on November 14, 1854, and included the following :- 'At 10.50 General Canrobert, attended by his staff, and Brigadier-General Rose, rode up to Lord Raglan, and the staffs of the two Generals and their escorts mingled together in praise of the magnificent charge of our cavalry (Heavy Brigade), while the chiefs apart conversed over the operations of the day, which promised to be one of battle.' It is clear that Rose was actually present with Raglan during the later morning. He did not record the forward advance of the Light Brigade, but he was a witness to the ghastly aftermath.

Rose's Journal : (British Library Add 42837; ff 74-77: By permission of The British Library.)

Wednesday 25th October

#### Cause of Cannonade

Trochu<sup>1</sup> came back at 11 o'clock last night. It is supposed that the Russians were alarmed on having Artillery mounted in the French Battery of [sic - at?] 600 Mètres, & opened the Cannonade. Proof of Weakness. 300 men would, if sent out, be a better measure than General Cannonade.

#### Russian Attack of Balaclava

An A.D.C. of General Bosquet came in haste (Gendarme) to say that the Russians were in large Force on this side of the Tchernaiia, threatening or rather, attacking, Balaclava. Canrobert rode there<sup>2</sup>, first ordering down Espinasse & the 1st Division. Its Right resting on No blank Redoubt. Its Left on the Road to Balaclava near the Coll. General Morris<sup>3</sup> was near, in rear of the Cavalry. The Turks were under arms & firing [?] from their Battery/res. We Joined Ld. Raglan<sup>4</sup>; [?][?][?][?] [?] [?] before [?]. English Cavalry exposed in confused order; I could not make out their Formation or what Formation they wished to make.


#### Turks Run

The Russ/an Cavalry pressed forward. The 92d (93rd) fired on them<sup>5</sup>. The Turks between (*sic - beside?*) 92d (93rd) baled<sup>6</sup>; We saw the Turks running in a long line in confusion from the Redoubt<sup>7</sup> over the crest; soon afterwards Russian Cavalry were advancing on their Left; they advanced with their lead [?] getting into the form of a Wedge; they came close to touching the British Cavalry, which had not appeared to advance; saw part of position (very great anxiety lest English Cavalry should turn<sup>8</sup>); the Russian Cavalry retired.<sup>9</sup> Exclamation of Trochu "Why did not other Regiments pursue?"<sup>10</sup> Lord Raglan, sent Vico<sup>11</sup> to Gen Canrobert to allow Espinasse<sup>12</sup> to go down; this was agreed; sent order to him to go as far as 1st Redoubt<sup>13</sup>; Lord Raglan asked Canrobert for permission for Chasseurs d'Afrique This was agreed<sup>14</sup>; they trotted down to Left of English; formed 2 lines of Regiment; soon afterward the Chasseurs d'Afrique brought their Right Shoulders up<sup>15</sup> & went up the crest of the hill in front of a small Encampment.<sup>16</sup> They formed 2 lines; the 1st Line charged; it appears, were driven back; they charged again and drove on the Russian Infantry & Artillery. French Chasseurs à pied (Infantry) went up the height (*sic - height*) & had, at one time, 4 guns.



Canrobert sent me to tell Lord Raglan of the movement of 'his' Chasseurs d'Afrique<sup>17</sup>; Somerset said that he had taken orders to Cardigan to charge; Hardinge said the same.<sup>18</sup> Somerset said "They say down there that he has lost his head; that he regularly funks."



Lord Raglan, said "We must set the poor Turks right again, get the Redoubt<sup>19</sup> back." Airey told Lord Raglan that he (Airey) meant to take the Redoubt back; "Here, I will write the Order. Give me a bit of paper." He said to Nolan "guns give (*sic*) him (Lucan) that."<sup>20</sup> Nolan was much excited; "I'll lead them myself, I'll take & lead them on!"<sup>21</sup>



When they came back<sup>22</sup> we saw Cavalry, (English) coming back in long dribbling lines, [?] like after a hard run.<sup>23</sup> Directly afterward Trochu came up<sup>24</sup> and said "Sais tu, Rose! Votre Cavalerie a fait une faute impardonnable! Ils ont chargé contre un feu amère art(illerie)!"<sup>25</sup> Soon afterward we saw the ground covered with lumps, some larger than others; dead men & horses. The Russians were in the Rear in Line of Battle with Columns in Mass on their Flanks.

T(French Name) afterwards came to Tent; mass of cavalry on Left, a little hid by brushwood & resting its Left on the No. [blank] Battery which the Russians had taken<sup>26</sup>; I saw before between (*sic*) others & No. [blank] Battery, on the Russian Left of Battery & 7 or 8 guns in No. [blank] Battery, 7 near Cavalry. Russians were also on the 'Colinne pelée'.<sup>27</sup>

Canrobert went to Lord Raglan.<sup>28</sup> There was Talk that Lucan had complained bitterly of the order which he had received to charge & of Nolan who, when he [?] - started with him (Lucan) shewing impossibility of charging between two Batteries of Artillery & the whole Russian Army, replied "There's the road; there's the enemy!" & galloped on<sup>29</sup>; (*the*) 2nd (*1st*) shell struck him in the chest; he threw up his arm, & rode back, & fell off.





Lord Lucan, then ordered a charge<sup>30</sup>; they went past 8 or 12 guns.<sup>31</sup> Russian Infantry ran away<sup>32</sup>, other Infantry & guns opened a destructive fire on them, dreadful (sic) shell, grape; they went 6 (670?) (*blank* - 195?) came back only. Morris<sup>33</sup> had a bad wound on his head. Hardinge said that Morris was quite unwell, he did not like to speak to him; (*l?* - *Young?*) Charteris was killed, lying on his back, arm extended, ball went through his cap & killed him<sup>34</sup>; Lord Raglan, seemed agitated, took Airey aside and said "They say that all this happened on account of the order you sent by Nolan to retake the guns."<sup>35</sup> Calthorpe<sup>36</sup> brought news of the decimation to Lord Raglan, afterward. Canrobert went down the hill to No. (*blank*- 5?) Redoubt; T[?] [?]; wretched Redoubt turned wrong way<sup>37</sup>

#### Defective Position

Sir Colin. Campbell came on with Sir George Cathcart who said to Canrobert that what he & other French Officers had said was quite true as to our having extended our position far too much across the plain of Balaclava; that we had only men enough for the Plateau & Balaclava; that our Line of Defence should reinforce the Mountain where Marines were, down to near Mamelons<sup>38</sup> & protecting the back road up to the Plateau<sup>39</sup> (which later Canrobert said). Canrobert entirely agreed & spoke in this sense very strongly to Lord Raglan.; He had previously asked me to come with him & had spoken in this sense to Lord Raglan & Steele<sup>40</sup>. We spoke then to Sir Colin Campbell, who said "I knew it but what will you have an unfortunate man do? they take me by the Shoulders & put me into Balaclava & try to defend it without any means, with a lot of Turks who run at the first shot."<sup>41</sup>

#### Reinforce for Balaclava

Canrobert begged me to tell Lord Raglan that he would send the Brigade of General Vinoy<sup>42</sup> to reinforce Balaclava; its Right on the height above (*Place name* - *Chacpol?*) in command of the back road. Raglan said: "Will he not send a Battery to this Redoubt?<sup>43</sup> Look, from it the Russians could fire into Balaclava."

I looked & told Canrobert who said he could not leave men in so exposed a position that they might abandon it; afterward agreed that the Turks should be left there for the night. Lord Raglan, went to the advanced Mamelon where Rifles were. He said that he would come back; delayed. Canrobert sent me to him (Raglan); Trochu kicked; (*I*) came home; heard Siege guns on ([?] - coast?) - 9 guns were in the Captured Redoubts.<sup>44</sup> Airey shewed a Map of the Redoubts Numbered, & those which had been taken, before he sent Nolan off.<sup>45</sup>

#### Source Notes:

<sup>1</sup> Colonel Louis Jules Trochu (1815-1896). Trochu was appointed ADC to St Arnaud in March 1854 and was engaged in the French expedition to the Dobrudja region in July and August 1854. He saw service at the Alma, and was still with the army after St Arnaud died. He was promoted Général de brigade, Nov 24, 1854 and was certainly serving under Bosquet by the time of the February 1855 reorganisation of the French army. He was placed in command of the 1st Brigade, 2nd Division, 1st Corps d'armée during the summer of 1855. He was seriously wounded on September 8, 1855, leaving the Crimea on October 16, 1855 to convalesce in France. For his services he was awarded the Légion d'honneur, class of Grand Officer. His foreign awards included Companion of the Order of the Bath, and the Sardinian Order of St Maurice and Lazarus, Class of commander, premier grade, and from Spain, the Order of Saint Ferdinand of Spain, class of commander. Camille Rousset dedicated his 'Histoire de la Guerre de la Crimée' (Hachette, Paris, 1894) to Trochu.

<sup>2</sup> Possibly near the French Corps d'Observation, in sight of Balaklava.



<sup>3</sup> General Louis Michel Morris (1803-1867) was assigned to command the French cavalry in the east, in March 1854 - although St Arnaud did not think much of him. The cavalry did not have a major combat role in the Crimea and the action of his Chasseur brigade on October 25, 1854 was one of just two occasions when the cavalry could be said to have been engaged in a solid combat. For his services he was awarded the Légion d'honneur, class of Commander. His foreign awards included Grand Cross of the Order of the Bath, the Medaglia al Valore Militare from Sardinia and from Spain, the Order of Saint Ferdinand of Spain, class of commander.

<sup>4</sup> On the Sapouné Ridge, at 10.50 a.m, according to W H Russell of 'The Times'. (That timing can now be corrected to 11.00 a.m.) Canrobert's 'After Action Report' of 27th October (quoted by Henry Tyrrell, 'The War with Russia' 3 volumes. Volume 1, pp. 313) makes it clear that he and Raglan first met at about 8.a.m. - 'As soon as information of this affair reached Lord Raglan and myself, we proceeded to the [Sapouné] heights which border the valley of Balaklava, and form the limits of our positions.' That wording differs somewhat from the despatch printed in the 'Illustrated London News' on 18 November 1854.

<sup>5</sup> In error for the 93rd Highlanders. This was the famous episode of 'The Thin Red Line'. Rose joined the 93rd Sutherland Highlanders in 1820 and was later brought into the 92nd Gordon Highlanders in Ireland as a regimental Major in 1829, serving with them until 1839.

<sup>6</sup> The Oxford English Dictionary gives a 19th Century usage of the verb 'to bail' as meaning 'to come out as if from a trapdoor' - as in the theatre. This may be the origin of our present-day verb 'to bail out'? If so, this seems an apt description of the Turkish departure.

<sup>7</sup> From Redoubt 4, given the timing after the actions involving the 'Thin Red Line'. The redoubts were numbered 1-5 from right to left as seen from the Sapouné Ridge.

<sup>8</sup> Possibly to be read as 'turn back'? That would have left the way open towards Balaklava.

<sup>9</sup> After the charge of the Heavy Brigade.

<sup>10</sup> Cardigan did not permit the Light Brigade to attack the retreating Russian cavalry and was heavily criticised for that, then and later.

<sup>11</sup> Colonel Jacques Marie Vico was Rose's counterpart as the French liaison officer at the British headquarters.

<sup>12</sup> Général de Brigade Esprit Charles Marie Espinasse (1815-1859) was placed in command of the 1st Brigade of the 1st Division (Canrobert) in March 1854 and became the acting divisional commander when Canrobert replaced St Arnaud following the Alma. His brigade was made up of the 1st Chasseur Battalion, the 1st Zouaves and the 7e de Ligne but the Zouaves were temporarily detached on Oct 17, 1854 and was not returned till the following spring. Hence it was not under his command on Oct 25, 1854. He had an eventful war although, apart from the Alma, he was not engaged in any major combat. He was promoted to the grade of Commander in the Légion d'Honneur on Aug 6, 1855, and rose to division command before the fall of Sebastopol. His foreign awards included Companion of the Order of the Bath and the Medaglia al Valore Militare from Sardinia.

<sup>13</sup> Presumably it was Canrobert (not Raglan) who sent that order (probably via Bosquet) to Espinasse? Todle- ben's account states that, soon after 10.30 a.m, 'Espinasse' brigade appeared and occupied the area near Redoubt No. 5.'



<sup>14</sup> In French military usage, familiar to Rose, the word 'permission' means 'leave of absence'. This can be read, therefore, to place the French Chasseurs d'Afrique under Raglan's orders. Canrobert's 'After Action Report' of 27th October (see 4, above) states; 'It was evidently his intention to entice us into deserting our excellent position, and to make us descend towards him into the plain. I contented myself with uniting, at the request of Lord Raglan, my cavalry to the English horse, which occupied a position on the plain before Balaklava, and which had already executed a most brilliant charge against the enemy's cavalry.' This accords well with Rose's Journal entry. If not actually under Raglan's (or Lucan's?) orders, the French Cavalry was at least instructed to co-operate with the British.

<sup>15</sup> That is 'inclined to their left'.

<sup>16</sup> Rose did not record the advance of the Light Brigade but he did see the successful French attack on the Russian guns on the Fedioukine Heights. Most (or all) accounts state that the successful relieving attack occurred as the Light Brigade was returning. Whatever the Allied cavalry's objectives in and around the North Valley, a preliminary or simultaneous clearance of those guns would have been very desirable. Did the French cavalry attack in support of the Light Brigade take place later than intended?

<sup>17</sup> The single inverted commas around 'his' are in the original. This can be read to confirm that the French Chasseurs d'Afrique were under Raglan's orders. See 14, above. Canrobert's 'After Action Report' of 27th October states: 'During this time my brigade of Chasseurs d'Afrique which was in the plain on the left of the English cavalry, was eager to get to its assistance, and did so by a bold manoeuvre,...'.

<sup>18</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel George Poulett Somerset was an A.D.C. to Lord Raglan and Captain Arthur Hardinge (DAQMG, 3rd Division) was associated with Airey (QMG). These orders (from whom - Raglan or Airey?) presumably relate to the failure of the Light Brigade to attack the retreating Russian cavalry.

<sup>19</sup> Raglan refers to the recovery only of one redoubt and not at all to the recovery of the 10 guns in Redoubts 1-4. Which redoubt concerned Raglan most? From tactical considerations, securing Redoubt 4 might have been a priority, to provide an advanced strongpoint threatening Russian movements towards Balaklava. The French attack on the Fedioukine Heights would accord with that objective.

<sup>20</sup> Airey acted here as an executive officer, not simply as a scribe (see 46, below). Lucan informed the House of Lords (on 19 March, 1855) as follows:- 'General Airey told me this, - "I first of all communicated the order verbally to Captain Nolan. Captain Nolan turned his horse and was galloping away, when I called him back and put it in writing." And also 'Shall I be told that Captain Nolan was not in General Airey's confidence? Why, he told me himself that he had given to Captain Nolan his instructions verbally, and it was only when that officer was turning his horse away, that he detained him, and committed the instructions to writing.' The implication is that Airey composed and wrote out the 4th Order himself, albeit with Raglan's approval. Raglan may have insisted on the addition of the word 'Immediate'. Lieutenant Calthorpe, Raglan's ADC, later wrote that 'Previous to his departure, he (Nolan) received careful instructions both from Lord Raglan and the Quartermaster-General.'

<sup>21</sup> This is a direct (double inverted commas) quotation of Nolan's words. His intention may or may not have been approved by Airey and/or Raglan, but I have shown strong evidence that Nolan did attempt to redirect the Light Brigade towards the Causeway Heights (See Parts I and II). While Cardigan and others correctly denied that Nolan was 'leading' ('commanding') the Light Brigade,



his memorial in Holy Trinity Church, Maidstone (placed there by Airey and others) recorded that ‘He died at the head of the Light Brigade...’ - a form of words which states Nolan’s location at the time of his death, rather than his military status.

<sup>22</sup> When Rose came back to the Ridge or when the Light Cavalry came back?

<sup>23</sup> As in the hunting field.

<sup>24</sup> Trochu, unlike Rose, appears to have witnessed the forward advance of the Light Brigade. Had Trochu been down in the North Valley? If not, this should read ‘came up to me.’

<sup>25</sup> “Do you know, Rose! Your Cavalry have made an unforgivable mistake! They have charged against bitter artillery fire!” This compares well with “C’est magnifique, mais ce n’est pas la guerre! C’est de la folie!”, said by Canrobert, but often ascribed to Bosquet.

<sup>26</sup> Possibly Redoubt 2.

<sup>27</sup> That is: ‘Peeled (or Bald) Hill’. This may have been Redoubt 1 (Canrobert’s Hill’); ‘a hill’ rather than ‘a height’. It may have lacked brushwood cover, hence the adjective.

<sup>28</sup> This would suggest that Canrobert and Raglan met before Raglan’s confrontation with Lucan.

<sup>29</sup> Not the wording reported by John Blunt (Lucan’s Interpreter) - ‘There, my Lord, is your enemy and there are your guns!’ (D. J. Austin, ‘Blunt Speaking’, CWRS Special Publication No. 33) - but the sense of the reply is similar. Captain Edward Gage was an army staff officer on the day. His letter to his mother dated October 27, 1854 (NAM 1968-07-484) stated that “*Genl. Aireys A.D.C. Capt Nolan (to whom this misfortune is attributed by giving wrong orders) was killed by the 1st. shot, screeching like a madman to the Brigade, "Are you not coming on, follow me". He received a shot in the breast & fell dead.*” This apparently unbiased report lends further weight to my case that Nolan did try to redirect the Charge.

<sup>30</sup> In this sentence, ‘then’ may be a key word. Had Lucan intended to send off only the Light Brigade? Had Lucan himself realised the mistaken direction of the Light Brigade advance? Did he order the Heavy Brigade forward in support only after Nolan’s death? The Heavy Brigade advanced beyond Redoubt 3 and took severe casualties before their recall. The Light Brigade went much further and suffered accordingly.

<sup>31</sup> This refers to the Light Cavalry’s over-running the Russian guns and their gunners at the east end of the North Valley. Those guns were 8 of the 3rd Don Heavy Battery, perhaps augmented by a section of the 12th Horse Artillery battery.

<sup>32</sup> This refers to the withdrawal of Russian infantry from Redoubts 2 and 3 as the Light Brigade advanced. Those regiments formed square in anticipation of an attack by cavalry.

<sup>33</sup> Captain William Cholmeley Morris, commanding the 17th Lancers.

<sup>34</sup> Captain Walter Charteris (an ADC to Lucan, his maternal uncle) was reportedly decapitated by a cannon ball. His cousin - Lord Bingham, Lucan’s son - could not recover his body later but did bring back his watch and sword, according to John Blunt.

<sup>35</sup> This implies that Raglan (at first) held Airey responsible for the losses. During the afternoon, he blamed Cardigan and then, later, Lucan. Rose reports that Raglan spoke of an order sent by Airey



to 'retake' what could only have been captured British guns. Most significantly, none of the four written orders to the Cavalry included any specific instruction to 'take' or 'retake' guns. This, with other evidence, leads to an alternative scenario which would account for Nolan's actions and which will be presented in detail in a future article.

<sup>36</sup> Captain Somerset Calthorpe, A.D.C to Lord Raglan.

<sup>37</sup> I read this as confirmation (if one were required) of an error in the direction of the Light Brigade's advance. One suggestion is that the Light Brigade was intended to cross the Causeway Heights and proceed along the South Valley. This was advanced by Captain Arthur Tremayne of the 13th Hussars who wrote, in his later 'Crimean Notes': 'Nolan gave his message a few yards in front of where I was standing talking to poor old Goad. We were dismounted. There can be no doubt that Nolan gave the order to go where we did go. Cardigan told me this repeatedly afterwards. But I have no doubt Lord Raglan meant us to go along the southern valley and wheel to the left, to prevent the guns being taken out of the Turk's redoubts.' For various reasons, I doubt Cardigan's repeated assertions. I am entirely willing to credit Tremayne's view of Raglan's intention.

<sup>38</sup> Hillocks or knolls. Locations uncertain. Possibly Redoubts 4 and 5 on the Causeway Heights? The exclusion of Redoubts 1, 2 and 3 would have given a much tighter line, with more concentrated defence.

<sup>39</sup> The road from the Plain of Balaklava up to the Col.

<sup>40</sup> Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Montagu Steele was on the army staff as Raglan's Military Secretary.

<sup>41</sup> Campbell and Lucan admired the brave Turkish defence of Redoubt 1, according to John Blunt. Campbell (and many others) strongly disapproved of their rapid abandonment of Redoubts 2, 3 and 4 and their seven 12- pounder iron guns.

<sup>42</sup> General Joseph Baptiste Vinoy (1803-1880) commanded the 2nd Brigade of Canrobert's First Division throughout the army's sojourn in the east until after the fall of Sebastopol. This comprised the 9e bataillon de Chasseurs a pied (till December 13, 1854) and the 20e and 27e de Ligne. When Canrobert created two extemporised corps following the arrival before Sebastopol, the division came under Bosquet's command. Sent down from the heights on October 25, it was placed under the command of Sir Colin Campbell in the lines defending Balaklava, where it remained till the following spring.

<sup>43</sup> Location uncertain.

<sup>44</sup> Probably Redoubt 4.

<sup>45</sup> Redoubts 1-4 held ten British 12-pounder siege train guns (as shown by Major Colin Robins) and the Russians captured seven of them.

<sup>46</sup> That map may no longer exist. Perhaps Airey was seeking to defend himself against criticism? He certainly acted in a responsible executive role, as he did on a number of occasions during the Crimean War. A prime example of this is his letter of 2 April, 1855 to Viscount Hardinge (Commander-in-Chief) in London, which can be viewed at <http://www.crimeantexts.org.uk/sources/bsk/a2h.html> as document CUL Add.9554/1/33.



It includes “Lord Lucan insisted that the order to charge, or attack were imperative...we could see the Russians hooking their long traces to the Turkish guns, with the intention of carrying them off...the orders given could not be construed into orders to attack the enemy in position at all hazard, after the accomplishment of the very operation, it was intended to prevent”.